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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AS POLICE POWER MEASURES,
OF RECENT PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES REGULATING UNFAIR COMPETITION
William H. Wood*
The struggle for existence among all types of businessmen has been intensified tremendously by the recent economic depression, and this, in turn, has
caused considerable attention to be given to the problem of eliminating certain
types of unfair competitive practices which have become prevalent in many
businesses. As the striving for customers has grown keener, these unfair competitive practices have changed from comparatively minor annoyances to hazards
which many businessmen feel threaten their very existence. Thus, the type of
competition which, in a simpler and more primitive society was deemed to be
the life of trade, is now looked upon in many quarters as being likely to cause
its death.
During the past few years the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania considered the situation so serious as to make several types of

regulatory statutes a necessity. Accordingly, at the past two regular legislative
sessions the following acts were passed, primarily for the prevention of unfair
competitive practices on the part of various businessmen:
(1) The Act of June 5, 1935, P. L. 266 which legalizes contracts fixing
the resale price of trademarked articles.'
(2)
The Act of July 1, 1937, P. L. 2672 which prohibits the sale of
2
merchandise at less than cost.
(3) The Act of July 1, 1937, P. L. 2465 which inter alia fixes the maximum trade-in allowance for used automobiles and which prohibits the sale of
new automobiles for less than cost.2
(4)
The Act of June 2, 1937, P. L. 1193 which inter alia requires retail
gasoline dealers to post the prices for which gasoline is sold.'
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It will facilitate discussion of the specific provisions of these four statutes
as proper exercises of the police power 5 if brief consideration first be given to
the general principles which prescribe the bounds of police power regulation.
It is well established that a police power statute must meet two tests if it is
to be valid under Federal and State Constitutions.6 These are:
(a) Is the objective sought to be attained by the statute within the recog7
nized field of police power regulation?
(b) Are the means adopted by the statute reasonably related to the
attainment of the desired objective? 8
It is obvious that the second of these tests can only be considered in connection with the specific provisions of the statutes now under discussion, but it
will conserve both time and space to discuss the first test with respect to the
general aim of all four statutes.
As will be brought out in greater detail later, the general objective of each
of these statutes is the regulation or prohibition of certain common business
practices detrimental to the general public welfare chiefly in that they encourage
destructive price wars and foster the growth of monopolies.
It has long been recognized that the police power of a state government
includes the power to pass legislation for the protection of the public welfare,
as distinguished from the public health, safety or morals.9 It is equally well
5This discussion is concerned only with the validity of these statutes as police power
measures, or in other words, with ascertaining whether, as valid exercises of the police power
they are saved from violating the provisions of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution
and Article 1, Sections 1, 9 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The possible effect of
other constitutional provisions upon these acts is beyond the scope of this article.
6
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934), 89 A.L.R. 1469; Liggett v.
Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 73 L. ed. 204 (1928); Nashville C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters,
294 U. S. 405, 79 L. ed. 949 (1934); Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124 (1919); Rohrer v. Milk
Control Board, 322 Pa. 257 (1936) ; Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 274 Pa. 489 (1922).
7
For examples of cases wherein the statute involved did not meet this test see Bryan v.
Chester, 212 Pa. 259 (1905), (Ordinance designed to improve the aesthetic features of a particular locality by regulating billboards); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association, 297 U. S.
189, 80 L. ed. 575 (t936), (Statute changing rights of withdrawing members of Building and
Loan Associations).
SThe question as to whether or not the means adopted are arbitrary or discriminatory is
sometimes viewed as a separate test of validity: Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association. 297
U. S. 189, 80 L. ed. 575 (1936).
However, it would seem that if a statute be reasonably
felated to the attainment of the end sought, it is of necessity neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
For example of cases where the statute involved did not measure up to this test see Liggett
-v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 73 L. ed. 204 (1928), (Pennsylvania statute requiring all owners
in corporation operating pharmacy to be registered pharmacists) ; Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. 270
U. S. 402, 70 L. ed. 654 (1926), (Pennsylvania statute prohibiting use of shoddy in bedding).
9
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315 (1909); Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 70 L. ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481 (1934); Nashville,
hattanooga and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 79 L. ed. 949 (1935); Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 (1894); Commonwealth ex. rel. v. Humphrey, 288 Pa. 280
(1927); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 296 Pa. 299 (1929); F-K Market House, Inc. v. Read.
ing, 310 Pa. 493 (1933).
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established that the police power comprehends the authority to regulate or
prohibit many types of unfair competition. 10
In view of past decisions, it is clear that the chief and general objective
hoped to be attained by these statutes is entirely proper and within the field of
police power regulation. It is in order, therefore, to consider the reasonableness
and efficiency of the means provided by them for the accomplishment of their
aims.
ACT OF JUNE 5,

1935,

P. L. 266.

(Fixing Resale Price of Trademarked Commodities)
This statute renders lawful those contracts between buyers and sellers or
manufacturers of trade-marked articles" wherein the resale price of such articles
is fixed.' 2 It also authorizes contracts providing that vendees of such articles
shall not resell them except to sub-vendees who agree, in turn, not to resell them
except at the price stipulated."3
The act provides that contracts fixing resale prices shall not govern in the
case of closing out sales, judicial sales and sales of damaged or deteriorated
goods. 4 . It sets forth that to knowingly and wilfully sell any commodity at
less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to its provisions shall constitute unfair competition actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby, whether or not the person making the sale was a party to the
price maintenance contract.' 8
Prior to the passage of this act contracts fixing the resale prices of goods
were considered illegal as being in restraint of trade and, therefore, contrary to
public policy. 16 However, the mere fact that this statute legalizes contracts
which were once contrary to public policy does not invalidate it.11
10Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164 (1912), (Statute pro.
hibiting sale of goods at lower rate in one place than in another for purpose of destroying or
preventing competition); Newman v. Atlanta Laundries, 174 Ga. 9"2, 162 S. E. 497, 87 A.L.R.
507 (1932), (Statute prohibiting licensing of laundries if schedule of prices indicate they will
engage in unfair competition) ; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412.
81 L. ed. 1193 (1937), (Statute regulating chain stores for purpose of mitigating evils of
competition between chains and independents); Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570,
78 I.. ed. 505, 90 A.L.R. 1285 (1934), (Statute regulating weight of loaves of bread, partly :o
prevent unfair competition among bakers) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 526, 78 L. cd.
940, 950 (1934) ; Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307, 6 A.L.R.
358 (1919).
lThe statute refers specifically to articles bearing the trademark, brand or name of the
producer.
2
1 Section 1, 73 PS 7.
IsSection
1, 73 PS 7.
4
1 Section 1, 73 PS 7.
5
l Section 2, 73 PS 8.
16Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 55 L. ed. 502
(1911); Ford Motor Co. v. Quinn, 70 Pa. Super. 337 (1918).
l7Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Marketing Assn., 276
U. S. 71, 72 L. ed. 473 (1928).
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One of the chief purposes of this change of attitude as to the economic
desirability of untrammeled competition was to regulate the use of trademarked
articles as "loss leaders." An article used as a "loss leader" is one which is
offered for sale at a greatly reduced price (often below cost) for the purpose
of attracting customers. This is done usually with the hope that it will prove
possible to retain such customers or to sell them other merchandise at excessive
prices. One result of this practice is to impair the valuable good-will which
usually exists in connection with a trade-marked article. Furthermore, when a
trade-marked article is offered as a "loss leader," the value of similar articles
held by competing merchants is reduced, which often leads to price wars. This,
in turn, tends to create monopolies.' 8
While there may be a wide difference of opinion as to whether or not a
regulation of the use of trade-marked articles as "loss leaders" is reasonably
related to the advancement of a proper legislative purpose, 19 the propriety of
such regulation is certainly fairly debatable and in such cases the judgment of
the Legislature is held to be conclusive.2 0 It must be presumed that the Legislature found as a fact that the type of unfair competition referred to in this
statute is so prevalent and detrimental to the general public welfare as to
necessitate regulation. Therefore, in the absence of clear and definite proof
to the contrary, it may be said that the regulation of the use of trade-marked
articles as "loss leaders" is reasonably related to the end sought, namely, the
21
prevention of destructive price wars and the growth of monopolies.
Considering now the question as to whether the specific means adopted by
the Act of 1935, P. L. 266 to regulate the use of trade-marked articles as "loss
leaders" are reasonable, it is apparent that they are, in the main, neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory.
18The United States Supreme Court has in ieveral cases indicated the relationship between
monopoly and sales below cost: United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693,
708, 71 L. ed. 1302 (1927); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160, 55 L. ed.
663 (1911); Stry Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 75 L. ed.
544 (1931).
19Arguments often raised against statutes of this type are that theyt (1) increase prices to
the consumer (2) promote formation of manufacturers' monopolies (3) throttle initiative of
efficient dealers.
20Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940, 89 A.L.R.
1469 (1934); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 337, 338, 48 L. ed.
679 (1904); Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Distiller's Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 81 L. ed. 109,
106 A.L.R. 1476 (1936); Pacific Coast Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 80 L. ed.
138 (1935); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 299 U. S. 87, 79 L. ed. 780 (1935); Central Lumber
Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164 (1912) ; Purity Extract Company v. Lynch,
226 2U. S. 192, 57 L. ed. 184 (1912).
lCases upholding Fair Sales Acts closely analogous to the Act of 1935, P. L. 266 have
been upheld in a number of states: Old Dearborn Dist. Co. v. Seagram Dist. Corp., 299 U. S.
183, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936) ; Bristol Myers Co. v. Tischauser, 18 F. Supp. 228 (1936) ; Johnson
and Johnson v. Wiessbard, 191 A. 873; 121 N. J. Eq. 585 (1937); Weco Products Co. v. Reed
Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 I11. 559*
2 N. E. (2nd) 929, 104 A.L.R. 1435 (1936); Max Factor and Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. (2nd)

446, 55 Pac. (2nd) 177 (1936).
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The act does not impose an absolute prohibition upon the use of trademarked articles as "loss leaders" but, by authorizing contracts fixing the resale
price of such articles, it affords producers or vendors who have been harmed by
the practice, and who are most in need of relief, an effective method of guarding
against it in the future. The effectiveness of the statute is further assured by the
provision authorizing the recovery of damages from persons selling trade-marked
articles for less than the price stipulated in a price maintenance contract.
It is usually necessary, in considering any statute which contains the slightest
suggestion of price regulation, to refer to the inevitable argument that no species
of price regulation is reasonably related to the protection of the public welfare
except in businesses "affected with a public interest."22 Businesses within this
category are limited to the following: (a) public utilities; (b) certain trades
and occupations, such as the occupation of innkeeper; (c) businesses operating
under such circumstances as to be of particular public concern, such as the keep23
ing of grain elevators.
However, the limitation of price regulation to these so-called businesses
"affected with a public interest" (although adopted in numerous cases) has been
an unsatisfactory and unsubstantial restriction, and in the comparatively recent
case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the Supreme Court of tho United States has
limited greatly the operation and relaxed the rigidity of this principle. In view
of this decision it is safe to say that upon proper occasion and by appropriate
measures price regulation is no longer improper per se in businesses which are
not within the established category of businesses "affected with a public interest.
Furthermore, it is to be remembered that this statute does not represent an
unconditional price regulation by the Legislature. Rather, it merely affords
certain persons the right to fix prices by contract.
It does, however, extend the duty of abiding by the prices thus fixed to
persons who were not parties to any price maintenance contract. Here, perhapi:, lies the greatest objection to the validity of this act as a reasonable exercise
of the police power. Since it makes even persons who were not parties to price
maintenance contracts liable to suits for damages for knowingly selling trademarked articles at prices below those fixed in such contracts, it may well be
viewed as arbitrary in that such persons have not acceded to the resale price thus
2

- Cases re businesses "affected with public interest": Tyson and Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1877); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 76 L. ed. 747 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U. S. 235, 73 L. ed. 287 (1929).
23Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. ed. 1103
(1923).4
: Nebbia v. New York. 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940; 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934), at p. 956,
L. ed.
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fixed,2 5 and, in fact, may even have been unaware of it at the time the article
26
was purchased.
However, statutes containing this same provision have been upheld by other
couits, including the Supreme Court of the United States, 27 and even if the
Pennsylvania courts were to consider it invalid, the act is severable 28 and the
remainder likely will be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power.
It is not a valid objection to this statute that the use as "loss leaders" of
ordinary articles not bearing trade-marks is equally detrimental to the public welfare as is the use of trade-marked articles. 29 It is within the province of the
legislature to aim regulatory measures at whichever particular phase of a general
problem is most in need of attention.
Nor can the act be objected to as tending to foster monopolies, for it
provides expressly that it shall not be deemed to authorize price maintenance
contracts between wholesalers, producers or retailers.3 0
"I'n several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions 'affected with a public
interest' and 'clothed with a public use,' have been brought forward as the criteria of the
validity of price control, it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and
form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation directed at business practices or
prices. These decisions must rest, finally, upon the bases that the requirement of due process
were not met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and effect. But there
can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate
a business in any of its aspects, including the -prices to be charged for the products or commodities it sells."
In the case of Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257 (1936), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania seems to view with favor this more liberal attitude, for in that decision it upholds
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Law, and the business of producing and
selling milk is not within the class of businesses "affected with a public interest," as that category
had been established in the earlier cases involving price regulation. On the other hand, the
Dauphin County Court, which is the court before which the constitutionality of most police
power statutes is first raised, has indicated that it still regards price regulation as being limited
to businesses of the type which have always been recognized as being "affected with a public
interest": Heinel Motors et al. v. William D. Teefy et al., 295 Commonwealth Docket, 1917
(not yet reported) ; Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Boardman etal., 308 Commonwealth Docket,
1937 (not yet reported); Scudder v. Smith, 45 Dauphin County 209 (1937).
2
61t has been indicated in several cases that price fixing by private parties is subject to the
same limitations as legislatitive price fixing: Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S.
t, 71 L. ed. 893 (1927); O'Gorman and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282
U. S.251, 75 L. ed. 324 (1931); Dist. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157,
57 L. ed. 164 (1912).

2
61t has been argued that this provision can be sustained on the theory that a price maintenance contract attaches something in the nature of an equitable servitude to the articles involved,
and that this restriction follows the article into the hands of all purchasers. This, however,
would require that the section be construed as applicable only to persons who purchase articles
with knowledge of the existence of a price maintenance contract: Washington ex. rel. Seattle
Title Trust Company v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 73 L. ed. 210 (1928).
2 1
7 n the Dearborn Case it was held that this provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable
because
its application could be avoided by removing the trademark before sale.
28
Section

29

5, 73 PS 11.

Commonwealth v. Muir, 1 Pa. Super. 578 (1896); Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. '.
Taylor, 234 U. S.224, 79 L. ed. 1288 (1914); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S.
157, 57 L. ed. 164 (1912).

8OSection 3, 73 PS 9.
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1937, P. L. 2672.

(Prohibiting the Sale of Merchandise at Less Than Cost)
The Act of June 5, 1935, P. L. 266 which was designed to prevent the use
of trade-marked articles as "loss leaders," was followed by the Act of July 1,
1937, P. L. 2672 which was enacted to prevevnt the use of any type of merchandise as "loss leaders."
As has been shown, the Act of 1935, P. L. 266 accomplished its purpose
by authorizing contracts fixing the resale price of trade-marked goods. The Act
of 1937, P. L. 2672, on the other hand, attempts to abolish the general use of
loss leaders by prohibiting the sale of all merchandise at less than cost.
The act defines cost 3 l as whichever is the lower of the following two figures:
(1) the total consideration paid for the article at the wholesale or retail outlet,
or J 2) the total consideration necessary for the replacement of the merchandise
at the wholesale or retail outlet, such consideration to be determined by applying
to said merchandise the same cost per unit as the last quantity purchased prior
to t he sale of said merchandise would have cost per unit if bought at the most
favorable market price available within 60 days prior to said sale. In computing
cost. merchants are permitted to deduct from the amount thus computed any
customary trade discounts.
The act makes it a misdemeanor to sell merchandise at less than cost,3 2 and
authorizes the issuance of injunctions restraining violations of its provisions. 33
It is obvious that this act constitutes a more direct and far-reaching interference with the previously accepted right to sell ordinary merchandise at whatever price the seller wishes, than did the Act of 1935, P. L. 266. Nevertheless,
it is aimed at the same type of unfair competition as was the earlier act and its
constitutionality as a police regulation should be governed by analogous principles.
The use of all types of merchandise as "loss leaders," which is prohibited
by the Act of 1937, P.L. 2672, adversely affects the public welfare, just as does
the similar use of trade-marked articles, in that customers are often attracted
thereby for the purpose of selling them other articles at higher or excessive prices.
The use of all types of merchandise as "loss leaders" also tends to destroy
competition, leads to price cutting and creates monopolies.
A number of cases have already been referred to which recognize that the
prevention of unfair business practices that tend to destroy competition, foster
34
price cutting and create monopolies is a proper objective of police regulation.
8:ISection 1, 73
32
Section 3, 73
83Section 4, 73
84See Footnote

PS 201.
PS 203.
PS 204.
10.
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In addition, the decisions in other jurisdictions upholding statutes legalizing
price maintenance contracts indicate definitely that the regulation of the use of
"loss leaders" is reasonably connected with the prevention of price wars and with
the growth of monopolies.85 It is true that those statutes were aimed solely at
preventing the use of trade-marked articles as "loss leaders," but they were aimed
at the same type of unfair trade practice as is the Act of 1937, P. L. 2672.
Even more in point, the courts of several other jurisdictions have held to be
valid Unfair Trade Practice statutes almost identical to the Act of 1937, P. L.
2672.36

Turning now to a consideration of the effectiveness and reasonableness of
certain specific provisions of this act, it is to be repeated here that the act should
not be held invalid merely because of its element of price fixing.i 6 a In the first
place the act does not actually fix prices, but merely prescribes a certain minimum
below which merchants are prohibited from going. Otherwise they are free to
sell their merchandise at any price desired. In light of the recent more liberal
attitude of the courts toward price regulation, which has been discussed in some
detail above in connection with the Nebbia Case, the Legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in taking the position that the public concern in the use
of "loss leaders" justified the limited form of price regulation set forth in this
act. It should be noted that in the decisions already referred to,8 7 upholding
Fair Sales Acts and Unfair Trade Practice Acts in other states, the limited price
regulating feature of such acts were considered in the light of the Nebbia Case
and were held to be proper and reasonable means of preventing unfair competition, through the regulation of "loss leaders."
Serious objection to the statute could not be based on the theory that the use
55

See Footnote 21.
36Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy and Tobacco Co., 82 Pac. (2nd)
3 (1938); (California Unfair Practices Act held constitutional). See also People v. Kahn, 2
Cal. Supp. 191, 60 P. (2nd) 596 (1936).
In the cases of Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau
v. National Candy and Tobacco Co., 74 Pac. (2nd) 848 (1937), and Balzer v. Caler, 74
Pac. (2nd) 839 (1937) the California Act had been held unconstitutional as being price regulation in businesses not affected with a public interest. Rust v., Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113
S. W. (2nd) 733 (1937); (Tennessee Unfair Practices Act held constitutional) ; Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 Fed. Supp. 70 (1938), (Minnesota Unfair Practices Act held
unconstitutional). This decision, however, expressly recognizes the validity of the objective of
the statute and based its holding upon the arbitrary features of the means adopted to attain
that objective.
sHaIn the case of New Jersey v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., decided by the District Court
of Bergen County on October 24, 1938 (not yet reported), it was ruled that the New Jersey
Fair Sales Act, which prohibits the sale of merchandise at less than cost by retailers, is unconstitutional. The Court ruled the Act to be invalid as price regulation on the ground that the
business of retailers is not "affected with a public interest."
On December 1, 1938, Judge Valentine, in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne
County, in the case of Commonwealth v. Hodin, 33 D. & C. 449a (1938); quashed an indictment charging a violation of the Act of 1937, P. L. 2672, on the ground that the act is unconstitutional. This holding of unconstitutionality was based chiefly upon the theory that the
general sale of commodities is not "a business affected with a public interest" and that it is,
therefore,
improper to fix the prices of such sales.
87
Sec Footnotes 21 and 36, supra.
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of "loss leaders" is not prevalent in all types of business, and that a blanket prohibition is, therefore, unreasonable and unnecessary. The principle is now well
established that an exercise of the police power is not invalidated by the fact
that in the general field regulated there may be a few situations which do not
require such regulation.8 8 The Legislature, if it deems it necessary, is entitled
to aim a general prohibition at a prevalent practice, even though a few innocent
situations be affected.
The act contains adequate exemptions for any unusual situations for it sets
foith that its provisions shall not apply to clearance sales, judicial sales, liquidation sales, charity sales, sales of perishable or damaged merchandise, and sales
9
at prices reduced to meet those of competitors.'
The definitions of cost adopted by the statutes are in the main sufficiently
definite to be workable and sufficiently elastic not to be arbitrary.
It should be noted, however, that these definitions make no provision for
reckoning or including "overhead cost" or "cost of doing business." Accordingly, it might be argued that a merchant could comply with the statute by selling
his goods just above cost as therein defined, and still offer a species of "loss
leader" by omitting his cost of doing business from the sale price of such article.
Whether this would render the entire statute unreasonable on the ground that it
is ineffective is debatable.
There are certain other more objectionable features among the specific provisions of this act. In the first place, it may well be that the sections which
prohibit the sale or offer for sale of any merchandise at less than cost, regardless
of the intent of the merchant in making such sale, or the effect upon competitors
of .uch sale, are arbitrary and unreasonable.4 0 In the case in which the California
Unfair Trade Practices Act was upheld, 41 it was intimated that a prohibition upon
such sales, regardless of the intent or effect thereof, was arbitrary and unnecessary. A similar intimation was expressed in the case which declared the Minnesota Act unconstitutional. 2 It is argued that, in order to accomplish the objective of this act, it is only necessary to prohibit those sales at less than cost which
are made for the purpose of, or with the effect of, destroying competition. 42a
88People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982 (1912)
Semler v. Oregon State Board
of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 79 L. ed. 1086 (1935)
Pierce Oil Corporation v. City
of Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 63 L. ed. 381 (1919).
9
3 Section 5, 73 P.S. 205.
4
OFairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 71 L. ed. 893 (1927).
4
lWholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy and Tobacco Co., 82 Pac. (2nd)

3 (1938).
12 Ervin v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 23 Fed. Supp. 70 (1938).
.2aOn November 28, 1938, Judge Gardner, in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny
County, in the case of Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 88 Pitts. L. J. 597, 33 D. & C. 447a (1938),
quashed an indictment charging a violation of the Act of 1937, P. L. 2672, on the ground that
the act is unconstitutional. Judge Gardner's decision is based largely on the theory that the act
is arbitrary and unreasonable in prohibiting sales at less than cost, regardless of the intent or
effect of such sales.
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The only answer to this objection would seem to be that it was permissible
for the Legislature to consider intent and effect to be elements so indefinite and
difficult to prove that, in order to make the act efficient, it was necessary to impose a general prohibition against sales at less than cost. That this may be done
4
under some circumstances often has been indicated. 1
Clearly, however, this act is not as likely to be sustained by the Pennsylvania courts as is the Act of 1935, P. L. 266, which merely regulates the use of
trade-marked articles as "loss leaders." The earlier act not only lacked the arbitrary features of this statute, but the propriety of its objective was strengthened
by the protection it afforded to the. valuable good-will which is usually an incident of trade-marked articles. Furthermore, acts similar to the Act of 1935, P. L.
266 have been sustained in a number of courts of other jurisdictions, including
the United States Supreme Court, whereas there seems to be a split of authority
as to the constitutionality of acts such as the Act of 1937, P. L. 2672. It is submitted that a few simple amendments correcting the arbitrary features referred
to above would strengthen greatly the constitutionality of this act.
THE ACT OF JULY 1, 1937, P. L. 2465.

(Fixing Trade-in Allowances on Used Cars)
Another recent legislative measure which relates to unfair competition,
although it is less comprehensive than the two statutes already discussed, is the
Act of July 1, 1937, P. L. 2465 which regulates the activities of automobile
dealers. This act embodies numerous regulations of the used car business but,
in view of the scope of the present discussion, we are concerned chiefly with its
price fixing features.
The act creates a Motor Vehicle Dealers' Commission 4 and empowers
it to fix the maximum price which automobile dealers may allow for used motor
vehicles." 5 The respective prices are to be based upon the average sale price
of the various models of motor vehicles during the preceding thirty days, and
new prices are to be fixed every thirty days. 46 The bill provides for the selection
of appraisers to appraise used automobiles before their sale to used car dealers 47
and prohibits such appraisers from appraising vehicles at a greater amount than
thL price fixed by the commission.' 8 The act provides that the appraiser shall
43

Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 47 L. ed. 323 (1903) ; Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v,.
Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 57 L. ed. 184 (1912), Rast v. Van Dernan & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342,
60 L. ed. 679 (1916); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U. S. 568, 61 L. ed. 498 (1917).
43-It has been indicated that this act was recently declared unconstitutional in Luzerne and
Allegheny counties. See footnotes 36a and 42a.
44Section
4, 75 PS 1304.
5
4 Section 5, 75 PS 1304.
46Section 15, 75 PS 1315.
47Section 10, 75 PS 1310.
48Section 16, 75 PS 1316.

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

deduct from the allowance value of the car as fixed by him, the amount necessary
to place it in good repair.4 9
The act also prohibits dealers from allowing more for a used automobile
than the figure contained in the certificate of appraisal, and from selling new
cars for less than the manufacturer's list price, plus trnsportation kosts.60
The preamble of the statute indicates that the objective of its price regulating features is two-fold," 1 (a) to eliminate unfair and ruinous competition in
the used car industry, and (b) to protect the motoring public by improving
the condition of used cars on the highway. The struggle for sales among automobile dealers has induced many dealers to make excessive allowances for used
cars. This is, in effect, a type of price cutting and its result has been to force
many dealers out of business and to influence them, in an attempt to recover as
much as possible of the sum allowed for used cars to resell them without spending the money upon them necessary to place them in a safe condition. An
examination of the statute as a whole, however, indicates that its chief aim is to
regulate the severe and cutthroat competition among automobile dealers with
respect to the prices allowed for used cars.
As has been indicated, the prevention of unfair competition, which leads
to price wars and monopolies, is a proper objective of an exercise of the police
power. 52 The chief issue, therefore, in considering the validity of this statute,
is whether or not the means adopted are reasonably designed to secure the end
sought and are not arbitrary or discriminatory.
In the first place, this act goes much further than either of the two acts which
have been discussed. Its operation would 53 serve to fix the maximum price above
which owners of motor vehicles could not go in selling their cars to dealers, and
to fix a minimum price below which new cars could not be sold-."
Price regulation, because it affects private rights so directly and materially,
often is held to be an arbitrary and unreasonable means of police regulation in
ordinary circumstances, and while it is not necessary for a business to be "affected
49

Section 16,

75 PS 1316.
PS 1317.

5SOSection 17, 75

1This is the only one of the four statutes now being considered in which the Legislature
expressed, by way of a preamble, findings of fact indicating the necessity for the regulation.
Such legislative findings of fact are not essential to the validity of a statute, but they render
more difficult the burden upon contestants to show that the regulation is not reasonably related
to the protection of the public health, safety, morals or welfare: Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal
Company,
274 Pa. 489 (1922) ; Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 81 L. ed. 1210 (1937).
52
S See Footnote 10.
1
' 3Although the effective date of this act was set as July 1, 1937, its price regulating features
have never become operative. The Dauphin County Court, in the case of Heinel Motors Inc.,
et al. v. Teefy et al., 295 Commonwealth Docket 1937 (not yet reported), granted a preliminaiy
injunction, restraining the enforcement of the act and this injunction remainid in force until
November 22, 1938, when it was made permanent. See Footnote 23.
64The portion of this statute which prohibits the sale of new automobiles at less than the
manufacturer's list price is only a specific application of the same type of regulation prescribed
in the Act of 1937, P. L4 2672 which prohibits sales at less than cost. The validity of that
type of regulation has already been discussed and it need not be repeated here.
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with a public interest" in order to justify such regulation, the objective sought
to be obtained thereby must b-e of immediate and material concern to the public,
and the price regulation must be clearly and directly related to the attainment
of that objective." 5 The Pennsylvania Milk Control Law seems to have extended
as far into the field of price regulation as the courts of the Commonwealth are
likely to permit with respect to a business which is not, strictly speaking, within
the established category of a business "affected with a public interest."
The Milk Control Law was held to be unconstitutional in the Superior
Court by a four to three decision 5 6 and constitutional in the Supreme Court by
a five to two decision.57 It is obvious that the public concern in unfair competition in the milk business, and consequently in the adequacy and purity of
the milk supply, is more vital than is its concern in the rigorous competition
among motor vehicle dealers or in the adequacy of second hand cars. In other
words, while the milk business may be of sufficient public interest to justify
stringent price regulation, the motor vehicle industry probably is not.
On November 21, 1938, the Dauphin County Court, in an opinion written
by Judge Karl Richards, held this act to be unconstitutional, squarely on the
ground that the sale of new and used automobiles is not a "business affected
with a public interest" and that any regulation of the prices for which such
vehicles may be sold is, therefore, invalid.5 8
Little fault can be found with the result of this decision but it is submitted
that the same result should have been attained without placing such strong reliance upon the "business affected with a public interest" theory. In the first
place the accuracy of this principle as a rule of thumb test for determining the
validity of price regulating statutes has been questioned considerably. The decision would have constituted less of an obstacle for future price regulating legislation which undoubtedly will be deemed necessary in many fields, if it had been

based on the theory that the public concern in unfair competition among the
automobile dealers is not so great or immediate as to justify the stringent type
of price regulation embodied in this act, rather than upon the theory that no

price regulation is permissible in a business not within the arbitrary classification
of a "business affected with a public interest."

Also the decision invalidating

this act might well have been based upon the arbitrary and unreasonable aspects
of certain of its specific provisions.
The maximum price which may be allowed for used cars is to be the
average price at which the various models were sold during the previous thirty
days. "9 Thus, owners of cars which are below this maximum allowance in actual
55Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934).
6
t Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 281 (1935).
7

5 8 Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257 (1936).
5 t-leinel Motors Inc., et at. v. Teefy, et al., 295 Commonwealth Docket,
reported).
9
5 Section 15, 75 PS 1315.

1937

(not yet
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value may receive the actual appraisal value for their cars while the owners of
car; which are above the maximum allowance in actual value may receive only
the maximum allowance. This is an arbitrary requirement for, since dealers
may allow only the appraisal figure for a used car,4° the act could accomplish its
end equally well by allowing every car to be appraised at its actual value,
Another unreasonable feature of the act lies in the fact that it fixes an
arbitrary allowance of $50.00 for all used cars eight years or more in age. 61
The act is equally unreasonable in that it exempts from its operation trucks of
62
a capacity over one and one-half tons, buses ahd motorcycles.
Other objections which might be raised against the act are that it applies
to aLll sales of used motor vehicles, whereas to accomplish the desired end, it
need only apply to the turning in of used cars as a means of reducing the purchase price of new cars; and that there is no appeal from or review of the figures
fixed by appraisers. Also, there seems to be but little actual relationship between fixing of a maximum price allowance for used cars, and the adequacy and,
safety of such cars after their resale by dealers.
Even if the type of price regulation adopted by this act is not invalid per
se, as held by the Dauphin County Court, the arbitrary features referred to above
likely would render the act unconstitutional and the decision invalidating the
statute probably will be affirmed.
ACT

OF JUNE

2, 1937, P. L. 1193.

(Requiring retail gasoline dealers to post prices)
The last of the four statutes to be discussed at this time is the Act of June
2, .937, P. L. 1193, which regulates the retail gasoline industry in various respects. The portions of this statute which relate to unfair competition are those
which require retail gasoline dealers to post in a conspicuous location at their
places of business, a sign or signs showing the price for which liquid fuels are
sold.63 The act prohibits the sale of liquid fuels at less than the prices posted 6'
and it prohibits retail dealers from attempting to evade the price posting requirements by giving articles of value or services for which payment is ordinarily
required to purchasers of liquid fuels."6 Ostensibly the act was designed chiefly
to protect the public against fraud and deception, 66 but actually one of its main
objectives was the abolition of the practice of giving secret discounts which had
grown up among retail gasoline dealers.
SOSection
SiSection
2
13Section
l3Section
64 Section
5
'J Section

17, 75 PS 1317.
15, 75 PS 1315.
3, 75 PS 1303.
3 (a), 58 PS 163.
3 (b), 58 PS 163.
3 (b), 58 PS 163.

(AThe title provides, in part, that it is "An Act to protect the public against fraud and
deception .. "
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The struggle for customers among retail gasoline dealers had induced many
of them to offer secret or so-called "under canopy discounts" to certain favored
customers as a method of building up a clientele. As a result of this practice,
competing dealers often lost a large portion of their business without being aware
of the reason therefor. In many cases such dealers were moved to resort to
price wars in an effort to regain their customers and in these wars numerous
dealers inevitably were driven out of business. Thus the practice of giving secret
discounts tended to foster the growth of monopolies.6 7
It seems, therefore, that a prohibition of secret discounts is related reasonably
to the attainment of an objective which is entirely within the Legislature's police
power. It is contended in many quarters that the policy of this act is unwise,6 8
but this is a question of legislative wisdom and if the desirability of the regulation is fairly debatable, the decision of the Legislature may not be reviewed.69
Whether or not the specific methods relied upon to control this type of
unfair competition are unreasonable or arbitrary is a more serious question.
A few years ago the United States Supreme Court in the case of Williams
v.Standard Oil Company, 70 ruled that the gasoline industry is not within the

category of a "business affected with a public interest," and that a statute regulating the price of gasoline was unconstitutional.7 1
This case, however, antedated the Nebbia decision and, as has been indicated, 721 that decision established a markedly changed attitude with respect to
the validity of price regulation in businesses other than the type which had been
recognized as within the class of businesses "affected with a public interest."
In any event, this act, if it can be said to regulate prices at all, regulates
them only in an indirect and minor respect. It merely requires that retail
gasoline dealers give public notice of the prices for which liquid fuels will be
sold and that liquid fuels not be sold for other prices than those published.7 8
It might be noted in this connection that this act was first construed by the
7

6 1t is also alleged that the use of secret discounts, by depriving some dealers of so many
of their customers that they are unable to make a living, induces them to adulterate, misbrand
or short measure gasoline. An additional argument against the practice is that the portion of
the motoring public which does not receive the secret discount is discriminated against unfairly.
68The argument is often made that requiring prices to be posted leads to price wars, rather
than prevents them. It is also argued that if every dealer posts his prices, the better equipped
gasoline stations will attract the greater portion of the business, and the growth of monopolies
will thus be fostered:
6
gSee footnote 20.
70278 U. S. 235, 73 L. ed. 141, 60 A.L.R. 596 (1929).
'lt is interesting to note that the statute involved in this case also prohibited the granting
,of rebates and the selling of gasoline at different prices. The Dauphin County Court, upon tise
basis of this decision, ruled in the case of Scudder v. Smith, 45 Dauphin County 209 (1938),
that the business of selling oil and gasoline in Pennsylvania is not a "business affected with a
public interest."

"2 See footnote 22.
7
81t is interesting tb note that in the Act of June 5, 1937, P. L. 1689, barbers are prohibited from displaying price lists 'in
such s manner as to be visible from outside the shop.
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Department of Revenue 7 as prohibiting the sale of gasoline at a discount for
quantity purchases and as prohibiting the giving of premiums or services to
purcdasers of gasoline. 75 The act, as thus construed, was attacked in several
bills in equity filed in the Dauphin County Court, and in an opinion written
by Judge Richards, it was ruled that those sections of the act were unconstitutional which had been construed as prohibiting tle sale of gasoline at. a discount or the use of premium stamps."6 In this result the decision seems unassailable for it is difficult to see any sufficiently reasonable relationship between
the statute's objective of abolishing secret discounts and a prohibition against
all sales of gasoline at a discount or against the furnishing of premiums, services or articles of value. Such provisions seem to be arbitrary means of effecting the purpose sought by the statute for they restrict the rights of dealers much
more than is necessary to effect the desired ends. 7" In order to prevent secret
discounts it is only necessary to require dealers to post their prices, including discount prices and the nature of any premiums or services that are offered The desired element is publicity for the price in effect and, in view of that, it should
make little difference what that price may be or what comprises it.
Since this decision the Department of Revenue has taken the more reasonable position that the act merely requires all prices to be posted; together with
a notice of any discounts, premiums or services that may be included, and that
the giving of discounts, services or premiums is not prohibited."8 Operating in
this form the statute is probably a valid exercise of the police power.
It may prove difficult to explain the selection of the gasoline business for
this type of regulation when secret discounts constitute a prevalent and detrimental competitive practice in other types of business. Reference has already
been made, however, to the principle that the Legislature may set about cor£tecting an evil in the quarter in which it is most pernicious and that it is not
necessary to proceed against it at once on every front. 79 The Legislature may
have :Felt, with good reason, that competition among retail gasoline dealers is
more keen than in other businesses, and that the practice on the part of gasoline
dealer; of giving secret discounts is more prevalent and its evil potentialities are
greater than is the case with other business men. In any event, if the courts
are to be taken at their word, the burden of proving otherwise will be upon the
U4 Section 13, 59 PS 173, expressly charges the Department of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with the duty of enforcing the act.
75
Bulletin No. 1 issued by the Bureau of Liquid Fuels Tax on June 25, 1937.
76Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Boardman, No. 308 Commonwealth Docket (1937) (not
yet reported).
77
Hfowever, in the case of Commonwealth v. Latterman, 52 York 29 (1938) it was ruled
that thi; act, as originally construed by the Department of Revenue, was constitutional.
7
SBulletin No. 6, issued September 21, 1938.
79 Commonwealth v. Muir, 1 Pa. Super. 578 (1896); Keokee Consolidated Coke Company
v Taylo:r, 234 U. S. 224, 79 L. ed. 1288 (1914).
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person attacking the statute, and this burden will be comparatively difficult to
meet.80
In conclusion, it is of interest to note that in none of the foregoing statutes
is the problem of regulating unfair competition entirely disassociated from other
considerations. In each case the general public's indirect interest in the ability
of the various members in a particular business to make a living and in the prevention of the growth of monopolies is accompanied by a more immediate and
direct concern. Thus, the Act of 1935, P. L. 266, which authorizes price maintenance contracts applying to trade-marked articles, not only protects merchants
and manufacturers from the hazards of unfair competition, but also protects the
public against being lured by "loss leaders" to purchase other articles at excessive
prices. The Act of 1937, P. L. 2672, which prohibits sales at less than cost,
has a similar dual effect.
The Act of 1937, P. L. 2465, which fixes prices of new and used automobiles, in addition to preventing unfair competition among automobile dealers,
purports to place used cars in a safer condition for travel on the highways.
Finally, the Act of 1937, P. L. 1193, which prohibits retail gasoline dealers

from giving secret discounts, also protects the general motoring public from the
discrimination which arises when secret discounts are given to a favored group
of customers, and from the adulteration, misbranding and short measure of
gasoline which is encouraged when retail gasoline dealers are unable to make
a fair margin of profit.
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